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Abstract
We introduce a new random key predistribution scheme for securing heterogeneous
wireless sensor networks. Each of the n sensors in the network is classified into r classes
according to some probability distribution µ = {µ1, . . . , µr}. Before deployment, a
class-i sensor is assigned Ki cryptographic keys that are selected uniformly at random
from a common pool of P keys. Once deployed, a pair of sensors can communicate
securely if and only if they have a key in common. We model the communication
topology of this network by a newly defined inhomogeneous random key graph. We
establish scaling conditions on the parameters P and {K1, . . . ,Kr} so that this graph i)
has no isolated nodes; and ii) is connected, both with high probability. The results are
given in the form of zero-one laws with the number of sensors n growing unboundedly
large; critical scalings are identified and shown to coincide for both graph properties.
Our results are shown to complement and improve those given by Godehardt et al. and
Zhao et al. for the same model, therein referred to as the general random intersection
graph.
Keywords: Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks, Security, Key Predistribution, Inhomo-
geneous Random Key Graphs, Connectivity.
1 Introduction
Random key graphs are naturally induced by the Eschenauer-Gligor (EG) random key predistribu-
tion scheme [9], which is a widely recognized solution for securing wireless sensor network (WSN)
communications [4, 8]. Denoted by G(n,K,P ), random key graph is constructed on the vertices
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} as follows. Each vertex vi is assigned independently a set Σi of K cryptographic
keys that are picked uniformly at random from a pool of size P . Then, any pair of vertices vi, vj are
adjacent if they share a key, i.e., if Σi∩Σj 6= ∅. Random key graphs have recently received attention
in a wide range of areas including modeling small world networks [24], recommender systems [14],
and clustering and classification analysis [11]. Properties that have been studied include absence of
isolated nodes [23], connectivity [25, 17], k-connectivity [27], and k-robustness [26], among others.
In this paper we propose and study a variation of the EG scheme that is more suitable for
heterogeneous WSNs; it is in fact envisioned that many military and commercial WSN applications
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will consist of heterogeneous nodes [19, 18]. Namely, we assume that the network consists of sensors
with varying level of resources (e.g., computational, memory, power) and possibly with varying level
of security and connectivity requirements. As a result of this heterogeneity, it may no longer be
sensible to assign the same number of keys to all sensors in the network as prescribed by the EG
scheme. Instead, we consider a scheme where the number of keys that will be assigned to each sensor
is independently drawn from the set K = {K1, . . . ,Kr} according to some probability distribution
µ = {µ1, . . . , µr}, for some fixed integer r. We can think of this as each vertex vx being assigned to
a priority class-i with probability µi > 0 and then receiving a key ring with the size Ki associated
with this class. As before, we assume that once its size is fixed, the key ring Σx is constructed by
sampling the key pool randomly and without replacement.
Let G(n;µ,K, P ) denote the random graph induced by the heterogeneous key predistribution
scheme described above, where again a pair of nodes are adjacent as long as they share a key; see
Section 2 for precise definitions. Inspired by the recently studied inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER)
graphs [3, 5], we refer to this graph as the inhomogeneous random key graph. The main goal of this
paper is to study connectivity properties of G(n;µ,K, P ) and to understand how the parameters
n,µ,K, P should behave so that the resulting graph is connected almost surely. Such results can be
useful in deriving guidelines for designing heterogenous WSNs so that they are securely connected.
By comparison with the results for the standard random key graph, they can also shed light on the
effect of heterogeneity on the connectivity properties of WSNs.
We establish zero-one laws for the property that G(n;µ,K, P ) has no isolated nodes (see Theo-
rem 3.1) and for the property that G(n;µ,K, P ) is connected (see Theorem 3.2). Namely, we scale
the parameters K and P and provide critical conditions on this scaling such that the resulting
graph almost surely has no isolated node (resp. connected) and almost surely has at least one iso-
lated node (resp. connected), respectively, when the number of nodes n goes to infinity. We show
that the critical conditions for the two graph properties coincide, meaning that absence of isolated
nodes and connectivity are asymptotically equivalent properties for the inhomogeneous random key
graph. Other well-known models that exhibit the same behavior include ER graphs [2], random
key graphs [25], and random geometric graphs [16].
Our results are also compared with the existing results by Zhao et al. [26] and Godehardt et
al. [11] for the k-connectivity and connectivity, respectively, of G(n;µ,K, P ); in those references
G(n;µ,K, P ) was referred to as a general random intersection graph. We show that earlier results
are constrained to parameter ranges that are unlikely to be feasible in real world WSN implemen-
tations due to excessive memory requirement or very limited resiliency against adversarial attacks.
On the contrary, our results cover parameter ranges that are widely regarded as feasible for most
WSNs; see Section 3.3 for details.
In addition, our main results indicate that the minimum key ring size in the network has a
significant impact on the connectivity of G(n;µ,K, P ), perhaps in a way that would be deemed
surprising. In particular, for the standard random key graph G(n;K,P ) the critical threshold for
connectivity and absence of isolated nodes is known [25, 17] to be given by K
2
P ∼ c log nn and the
resulting graph is asymptotically almost surely connected (resp. not connected) if c > 1 (resp. c <
1). For the inhomogeneous random key graph G(n;µ,K, P ) one would be tempted to think that
an equivalent result holds under the scaling
K2avg
P ∼ c lognn , with Kavg =
∑r
j=1 µjKj denoting the
mean key ring size. Instead, we show that the zero-one laws for absence of isolated nodes and
connectivity hold under
KminKavg
P ∼ c lognn , where Kmin stands for the minimum of {K1, . . . ,Kr};
see Corollary 3.3. This implies that in the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme, the mean
number of keys required per sensor node to achieve connectivity can be significantly larger than
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that required in the homogeneous case. For instance, the expense of allowing an arbitrarily small
fraction of sensors to keep half as many keys as in the homogeneous case would be to increase the
average key ring size by two-fold.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give detailed description of
the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme and the resulting inhomogeneous random
key graph model. Section 3 is devoted to presenting the main results of the paper, namely the
zero-one laws for absence of isolated nodes (see Theorem 3.1) and for connectivity (see Theorem
3.2) in inhomogeneous random key graphs. There, we also compare our results with relevant work
from the literature and also comment on the implications of our results on designing secure sensor
networks. In Section 4, we present some preliminary technical results that will be useful in proving
the main results of the paper. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is outlined in Section 5 with necessary
technical steps completed in Section 6. We start the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Section 7 and complete
it in Sections 8 through Section 10.
We close with a word on notation and conventions in use. All limiting statements, including
asymptotic equivalences, are understood with the number of sensor nodes n going to infinity. The
random variables (rvs) under consideration are all defined on the same probability triple (Ω,F ,P).
Probabilistic statements are made with respect to this probability measure P, and we denote the
corresponding expectation and variance operators by E and var, respectively. We use the notation
=st to indicate distributional equality. The indicator function of an event E is denoted by 1 [E],
while Ec denotes the complement of E. We say that an even holds with high probability (whp) if
it holds with probability 1 as n → ∞. For any discrete set S we write |S| for its cardinality. In
comparing the asymptotic behaviors of the sequences {an}, {bn}, we use an = o(bn), an = w(bn),
an = O(bn), an = Ω(bn), and an = Θ(bn), with their meaning in the standard Landau notation.
We also use an ∼ bn to denote the asymptotic equivalence limn→∞ an/bn = 1.
2 Model Definitions
Consider a network that consists of n sensor nodes labeled as v1, . . . , vn. Our key predistribution
idea is based on classifying the nodes in this network into r sets (e.g., depending on their level of
importance) and then assigning different number of cryptographic keys to sensors based on their
class. Assume that each of the n nodes in the network are independently assigned to a class
according to some probability distribution µ : {1, . . . , r} → (0, 1). Namely, with tx denoting the
class (or, type) of node vx, we have
P [tℓ = i] = µi > 0, i = 1, . . . , r,
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , n. Then, a class-i node is assigned Ki keys that are selected uniformly at
random from a pool of size P , for each i = 1, . . . , r. More precisely, the key ring Σx of a node x is
an PKtx -valued random variable (rv) where PA denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , P}
which contain exactly A elements – Obviously, we have |PA| =
(
P
A
)
. It is further assumed that the
rvs Σ1, . . . ,Σn are independent and identically distributed.
Let K = (K1, . . . ,Kr) and µ = (µ1, . . . , µr). Without loss of generality we assume that
K1 ≤ K2 ≤ · · · ≤ Kr. Consider a random graph G defined on the vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn} such
that two nodes vx and vy are adjacent, denoted vx ∼ vy, if they have at least one key in common
in their corresponding key rings. Namely, we have
vx ∼ vy if Σx ∩Σy 6= ∅. (1)
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The adjacency condition (1) defines the inhomogeneous random key graph, hereafter denoted
G(n;µ,K, P ). The name is reminiscent of the recently studied inhomogeneous random graph [3]
model where nodes are again divided into r classes, and a class i node and a class j node are
connected with probability pij independent of everything else. This independence disappears in
the inhomogeneous random key graph case, but one can still compute pij as
pij := 1−
(
P−Ki
Kj
)
( P
Kj
) , i, j = 1, . . . , r. (2)
In view of (2), our key predistribution scheme results in higher priority nodes (i.e., nodes with
more assigned keys) connecting with each other with higher probability; see Proposition 4.1. In
presenting our results below, we shall make use of the mean probability of edge occurrence for each
node class. Namely, we define
λi :=
r∑
j=1
pijµj, i = 1, . . . , r, (3)
where pij denotes the probability that a node of class-i and a node of class-j have an edge in
between; see (2). It is easy to see that the mean number of edges incident on a node (i.e., the
degree of a node) of class-i is given by (n− 1)λi.
Throughout, we assume that the number of classes r is fixed and do not scale with n, and so are
the probabilities µ1, . . . , µr > 0. All remaining parameters are assumed to be scaled with n, and we
shall be interested in the properties of the resulting inhomogeneous random key graph as n grows
unboundedly large. The dependence of scheme parameters and events on n will be denoted by a
subscript, while that of some variables will be denoted by a parenthesis. For instance, we define
pij(n) := 1−
(Pn−Ki,n
Kj,n
)
(
Pn
Kj,n
) , i, j = 1, . . . , r, (4)
and
λi(n) :=
r∑
j=1
pij(n)µj , i = 1, . . . , r. (5)
3 Main Results and Discussion
3.1 The results
Our main results are presented next. To fix the terminology, we refer to any mappingK1, . . . ,Kr, P :
N0 → Nr+10 as a scaling as long as the conditions
1 ≤ K1,n ≤ K2,n ≤ · · · ≤ Kr,n < Pn (6)
are satisfied for all n = 2, 3, . . .. To simplify the notation, we also let Kn = (K1,n,K2,n, . . . ,Kr,n).
We first present a zero-one law for the absence of isolated nodes in inhomogeneous random key
graphs.
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Theorem 3.1 Consider a probability distribution µ = (µ1, . . . , µr) with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r,
and a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that
λ1(n) ∼ c log n
n
(7)
for some c > 0. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
P [G(n;µ,Kn, Pn) has no isolated nodes ] =


0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1.
(8)
A proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found in Section 5. The scaling condition (7) will often be used
in the equivalent form
λ1(n) = cn
log n
n
(9)
with limn→∞ cn = c > 0.
Next, we present an analogous result for the property of graph connectivity.
Theorem 3.2 Consider a probability distribution µ = (µ1, . . . , µr) with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r,
and a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7) holds for some c > 0. Under the assumptions
Pn = Ω(n) (10)
and
(K1,n)
2
Pn
= w
(
1
n
)
, (11)
we have
lim
n→∞
P [G(n;µ,Kn, Pn) is connected ] =


0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1.
(12)
The condition (10) implies that there exists a constant σ > 0 such that
Pn ≥ σn (13)
for all n = 2, 3, . . . sufficiently large.
In words, Theorem 3.1 (resp. Theorem 3.2) states that the inhomogeneous random key graph
G(n;µ,Kn, Pn) has no isolated node (resp. is connected) whp if the mean degree of “the nodes that
have the least number of keys” is scaled as (1 + ǫ) log n for some ǫ > 0; in view of Proposition 4.1,
the nodes that are assigned the least number of keys have the minimum mean-degree in the graph.
On the other hand, if this minimal mean degree scales like (1 − ǫ) log n for some ǫ > 0, then whp
G(n;µ,Kn, Pn) has a node that is isolated, and hence not connected. The additional conditions
(10) and (11) are enforced here merely for technical reasons and are required only for the one-law
part of the connectivity result, Theorem 3.2. A detailed discussion on these additional conditions
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is given in Section 3.2, where we explain why they are likely to hold in many real-world WSN
applications. There, we also discuss how and when these conditions can be relaxed or replaced by
milder conditions.
Our results demonstrate that the inhomogeneous random key graph provides one more example
random graph model where the properties of absence of isolated nodes and connectivity are asymp-
totically equivalent. Other well-known examples include Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [2], random key graphs
[25], random geometric graphs [16], and intersection of random key graphs and ER graphs [21]. Our
results are also analogous to the recent findings by Levroye and Freiman [5] for the connectivity of
inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph model, where nodes are classified into r classes independently
according to a probability distribution µ and an edge is drawn between a class-i and a class-j node
with probability pij(n) independent of everything else. With λi(n) defined as in (5), their result
states that if mini=1,...,r λi(n) ∼ c log n/n then with c > 1 (resp. c < 1) the corresponding graph is
connected (resp. not connected) whp, under some additional technical conditions.1
We now present a corollary that states the zero-one laws of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 under
a different scaling condition than (7). This alternative formulation will make it easier to derive
design guidelines for dimensioning heterogeneous key predistribution schemes, namely in adjusting
key ring sizes K1, . . . ,Kr and probabilities µ1, . . . , µr such that the resulting network i) has no
isolated sensors and ii) is connected, both whp.
Corollary 3.3 Consider a probability distribution µ = (µ1, . . . , µr) with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r
and a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 . Let |Σ|n denote a rv that takes the value Ki,n with
probability µi for each i = 1, . . . , r. If it holds that
K1,nE [|Σ|n]
Pn
∼ c log n
n
(14)
for some c > 0, then we have the zero-one law (8) for absence of isolated nodes. If, in addition, the
the conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied by this scaling, then we also have the zero-one law (12)
for connectivity.
A proof of Corollary 3.3 is given in Appendix A, where we show that the scaling conditions (7)
and (14) are indeed equivalent to each other, meaning that one can obtain both Theorem 3.1 and
Theorem 3.2 from Corollary 3.3, and vice versa. We remark that E [|Σ|n] gives the mean number of
keys assigned to a sensor in the network. With this in mind, Corollary 3.3 provides various design
choices to ensure that no sensor is isolated in the network: One just has to set the minimum and
average key ring sizes such that their multiplication scales as (1+ ǫ)Pn lognn for some ǫ > 0. We also
see from Corollary 3.3 that such a scaling would also ensure connectivity as long as the additional
conditions (10)-(11) are also satisfied.
To compare with the homogeneous random key predistribution scheme, set r = 1 and consider
a universal key ring size Kn in Corollary 3.3. This leads to zero-one laws for the absence of isolated
nodes and connectivity in the standard random key graph G(n;Kn, Pn). Namely, with
K2n
Pn
∼ c log n
n
, c > 0 (15)
analogs of (8) and (12) are obtained for G(n;Kn, Pn); these results had already been established
[23, 25] by the authors (in stronger forms). An interesting observation is that minimum key ring
1Results in [5] cover more general cases than presented here; e.g., the case where the number of classes r is not
bounded.
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size has a dramatic impact on the connectivity properties of inhomogeneous random key graph. To
provide a simple and concrete example, set Pn = n log n. In the homogeneous case, we see from
(15) that the universal key ring size has to scale as Kn = (1+ ǫ) log n for some ǫ > 0 to ensure that
the network is free of isolated nodes and is connected. In the heterogeneous case, one gains the
flexibility of having a positive fraction of sensors in the network with substantially smaller number
of keys. For the absence of isolated nodes, a positive fraction of sensors can be assigned as few as
one key per node. However, from Corollary 3.3 we see that this comes at the expense of having to
assign a substantially larger key rings to a positive fraction of other sensors in the network. More
precisely, if K1,n = O(1) then we must have Kr,n = Ω((log n)
2) to have no isolated nodes under
the same setting. For connectivity on the other hand, we see from (16) that the minimum key ring
size K1,n can be kept on the order of O(
√
log n) and connectivity can still be achieved with mean
key ring size satisfying O((log n)1.5).
3.2 Comments on the technical conditions (10)-(11) of Theorem 3.2
We now provide a detailed discussion on the technical conditions (10) and (11) enforced in The-
orem 3.2. We will focus on i) the feasibility of these additional conditions for real-world WSN
implementations, and ii) when and how they can be replaced with milder conditions.
We start with the condition (10) that states the key pool size grows at least linearly with the
network size n. In terms of applicability in the context of heterogeneous key predistribution schemes
in WSNs, this condition is not stringent at all. In fact, it is often needed that key pool size Pn be
much larger than the network size n [6, 7, 9] as otherwise the network will be extremely vulnerable
against node capture attacks. From a technical point of view, the case where Pn = Ω(n) is also the
more interesting and challenging one as compared to the case where Pn = o(n). For instance, when
Pn = O(n
δ) for some 0 < δ < 1/2, the inhomogeneous random key graph G(n;µ,Kn, Pn) can be
shown to be connected for any µ as long as K1,n ≥ 2 ; see [22, Lemma 8.1] for a proof of a similar
result for the standard random key graph. This means that if Pn = O(n
δ) with δ < 1/2, even
two keys per sensor node is enough to get network connectivity whp. Finally, we remark that the
scaling condition (7) or its equivalent (14) already implies that Pn = Ω(
n
logn) since K1,nE [|Σ|n] ≥ 1.
Next, we look at the condition (11) and start with discussing possible relaxations. First of all,
(11) is stronger than what is actually needed for our proof to work; it is enforced to enable a shorter
proof and an easier exposition of the main result. By inspection of the arguments in Section 10.4,
it can be seen that (11) can be replaced with

K21,n
Pn
≥
2 log 2+log(1−µr)+ǫ
βν
n and K1,n = w(1), if µr ≤ 0.75
K21,n
Pn
= Ω
(
1
n(logn)M
)
and K1,n = w(1), if µr > 0.75
(16)
with some β > 0 and ν > 0 to be specified, and for any ǫ > 0 and any finite integer M ; the details
are omitted here for brevity.
As we look at (16), we see that K1,n = w(1) is needed for any µr. In fact, this condition can
easily be satisfied in real-world WSN implementations given that key ring sizes on order of O(log n)
are regarded as feasible for most sensor networks [7]. Considered in combination with (14), other
conditions enforced in (16) bounds the variability in the key ring sizes used in the network. In
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particular, given that
E [|Σ|n]
K1,n
=
K1,nE [|Σ|n]
Pn
(
(K1,n)
2
Pn
)−1
= Θ
(
log n
n
)(
(K1,n)
2
Pn
)−1
,
(16) implies E[|Σ|n]K1,n = O (log n) when µr ≤ 0.75 and
E[|Σ|n]
K1,n
= O
(
(log n)M
)
when µr > 0.75. Thus,
we see that when more than 75 % of the sensors receive the largest key rings, one can afford to use
much smaller key rings for the remaining sensors, as compared to the case when µr ≤ 0.75.
Collecting, while conditions enforced in (16) take away from the flexibility of assigning very
small key rings to a certain fraction of sensors (as we were allowed to do for the absence of isolated
nodes), they can still be satisfied easily in most real-world implementations. To provide a concrete
example, one can set Pn = n log n and have K1,n = (log n)
1/2+ǫ and E [|Σ|n] = (1 + ǫ)(log n)3/2−ǫ
with any ǫ > 0; in view of Theorem 3.2 and (16) the resulting network will be connected whp.
With the same Pn, it is possible to have much smaller K1,n when µr > 0.75. For example, we can
have K1,n = log log · · · log n and E [|Σ|n] = Ω((log n)2). Of course, one can also have all key ring
sizes on the same order and set K1,n = c1 log n and E [|Σ|n] = c2 log n with c1c2 > 1, to obtain a
connected WSN whp.
3.3 Comparison with related work
The random graph model G(n;µ,Kn, Pn) considered here is also known as general random in-
tersection graphs in the literature; e.g., see [26, 1, 10]. To the best of our knowledge this model
has been first considered by Godehardt and Jaworski [10] and by Goderhardt et al. [11]. Results
for both the existence of isolated nodes and graph connectivity have been established; see below
for a comparison of these results with those established here. Later, Bloznelis et al. [1] analyzed
the component evolution problem in the general random intersection graph and provided scaling
conditions for the existence of a giant component. There, they also established that under certain
conditions G(n;µ,Kn, Pn) behaves very similarly with a standard Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph [2]. Taking
advantage of this similarity, Zhao et al. [26] established various results for the k-connectivity and
k-robustness of the general random intersection graph by means of a coupling argument.
We now compare our results with those established in the literature. Our main argument is
that previous results for the connectivity of inhomogeneous random key graphs are constrained
to very narrow parameter ranges that are impractical for wireless sensor network applications. In
particular, we will argue below that the result by Zhao et al. [26] is restricted to very large key ring
sizes, rendering them impractical for resource-constrained sensor networks. On the other hand, the
results by Godehardt et al. [10, 1] focus on fixed key ring sizes that do not grow with the network
size n. As a consequence, in order to ensure connectivity, their result requires a key pool size Pn
that is much smaller than typically prescribed for security and resiliency purposes.
To fix the terminology, let Dn : {1, 2, . . . , Pn} → [0, 1] be the probability distribution used for
drawing the size of the key rings Σ1, . . . ,Σn; as before, once its size is fixed a key ring is formed
by sampling a key pool with size Pn randomly and without replacement. The graph G(n;Dn, Pn)
is then defined on the vertices {v1, . . . , vn} and contains an edge between any pair of nodes vx and
vy as long as Σx ∩Σy 6= ∅. The model G(n;µ,Kn, Pn) considered here constitutes a special case of
G(n;Dn, Pn) under the assumption that the support of Dn has a fixed size of r.
With these definitions in mind we now state the results by Zhao et al. [26] and by Goderhardt
et al. [11], respectively.
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Theorem 3.4 [26, Theorem 1] Consider a general random intersection graph G(n,Dn, Pn). Let
|Σ|n be a random variable following the probability distribution Dn. With a sequence αn for all n
defined through
E[|Σ|n]2
Pn
=
log n+ (k − 1) log log n+ αn
n
, (17)
if E[|Σ|n] = Ω
(√
log n
)
, var[|Σ|n] = o
(
E[|Σ|n]2
n(logn)2
)
and |αn| = o(log n), then
lim
n→∞
P
[
G(n,Dn, Pn) is k-connected
]
=


0, if limn→∞ αn = −∞,
1, if limn→∞ αn =∞,
e
− e
−α∗
(k−1)! , if limn→∞ αn = α
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞).
Theorem 3.5 [11, Theorem 2] Consider a general random intersection graph G(n,D, Pn), where
D(ℓ) = 0 for all ℓ > r and ℓ = 0. Namely, all key ring sizes are bound to be on the interval [1, r].
Let |Σ| be a random variable following the probability distribution D. Then if
n
Pn
(E [|Σ|]−D(1)) − logPn →∞ (18)
then
lim
n→∞
P [G(n,D, Pn) is connected] = 1.
Also, if D(r) = 1 for some r ≥ 2, and it holds that
n = Pn
logPn + o(log logPn)
r2
, (19)
then
lim
n→∞
P [G(n,D, Pn) is connected] = 0.
In comparing Theorems 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5, it is worth noting that k-connectivity is a stronger
property than connectivity, which in turn is stronger than absence of isolated nodes. However,
although Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 consider strong graph properties, we now argue why the established
results are not likely to be applicable for real-world sensor networks. First, Theorem 3.5 focuses on
the case where all possible key rings have a finite size that do not scale with n. In addition, with
E [|Σ|] fixed, it is clear that the scaling conditions (18) and (19) both require
Pn = O
(
n
log n
)
. (20)
Unfortunately, it is often needed that key pool size Pn be much larger than the network size n [9, 7]
as otherwise the network will be extremely vulnerable against node capture attacks. In fact, one
can see that with (20) in effect, an adversary can compromise a significant portion of the key pool
(and, hence network communication) by capturing o(n) nodes.
We now focus on Theorem 3.4, where the major problem arises from the assumption
var[|Σ|n] = o
(
E[|Σ|n]2
n(log n)2
)
. (21)
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For the model to be deemed as inhomogeneous random key graph, the variance of the key ring
size should be non-zero. In fact, given that key ring sizes are integer-valued, the simplest possible
case would be that D(K + 1) = µ and D(K) = 1 − µ for some 0 < µ < 1 and positive integer
K. This would amount to assigning either K + 1 or K keys to each node with probabilities µ
and 1 − µ, respectively. In this case, we can easily see that var[|Σ|] = µ(1 − µ) > 0 as long as
0 < µ < 1. Therefore, for an inhomogeneous random key graph, the condition (21) implies that
E[|Σ|n]2
n(logn)2
= w(1), or, equivalently that
E [|Σ|n] = w
(√
n log n
)
. (22)
Put differently, Theorem 3.4 enforces mean key ring size to be much larger than
√
n log n. However,
a typical wireless sensor network will consist of a very large number of sensors, each with very
limited memory and computational capability [9, 7]. As a result, key rings with size w(
√
n log n)
are unlikely to be implementable in most practical network deployments. In fact, it was suggested
by Di Pietro et al. [7] that key rings with size O(log n) are acceptable for sensor networks.
In comparison, our results Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 do not require either of the unrealistic
conditions (20) or (22). To see this, note that the enforced scaling condition (9) or its equivalent
(14) implies (see also Lemma 4.3))
K1,nKr,n
Pn
= Θ
(
log n
n
)
. (23)
It is clear that this condition does not require (20), and in fact already enforces Pn = Ω(n/ log n).
As mentioned earlier, in real-world implementations the key pool size is expected to grow at least
linearly with n so that the additional condition (10) of Theorem 3.2 is automatically satisfied.
The second additional condition (11) of our connectivity result and (23) can also be satisfied
simultaneously without requiring the prohibitively large key ring sizes given at (22). To provide
concrete examples, we can use Pn = Θ(n log n), K1,n = Θ(log n) and Kr,n = Θ(log n), or Pn =
Θ(n log n), K1,n = Θ(
√
log n) and Kr,n = Θ((log n)
3/2). With proper choice of constants in these
scalings, we will ensure that i) the resulting WSN is connected almost surely; ii) the key pool size
is much larger than the network so that the resulting WSN has good level of resiliency against
node capture attacks; and iii) the maximum key ring size used in the network is on the order of
the ranges log n or (log n)3/2 that are usually regarded as feasible [9, 7]; these choices also lead to
a much smaller mean key ring size than that prescribed in (22).
In conclusion, we showed that our results enable parameter choices that are widely regarded as
practical in real-world sensor networks, while previous results given in [26] and [11] do not.
4 Preliminaries
In this section, we establish several preliminary results that will be used in the proof of Theorem
3.1. The first result states that mean edge probabilities are ordered in the same way with the key
ring sizes.
Proposition 4.1 For any scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 , we have
λ1(n) ≤ λ2(n) ≤ · · · ≤ λr(n) (24)
for each n = 2, 3, . . ..
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Proof. In view of (5), the desired result (24) will follow immediately if we show that pij(n) is
increasing in both i and j. Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and recall that Ki increases as i increases. For any
i, j such that Ki + Kj > P we see from (2) that pij(n) = 1; otherwise if Ki + Kj ≤ P we have
pij(n) < 1. Thus, given that Ki +Kj increases with both i and j, it will be enough to show that
pij(n) increases with both i and j on the range where Ki +Kj ≤ P . But, on that range, we have(P−Ki
Kj
)
( P
Kj
) = (P −Ki)!
P !
(P −Kj)!
(P −Ki −Kj)! =
Ki−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− Kj
P − ℓ
)
. (25)
It is now immediate that
(P−KiKj )
( PKj)
decreases with both Ki and Kj, and hence with i and j. Hence,
pij(n) is seen to be increasing with i and j, and this establishes Proposition 4.1.
A useful consequence of Proposition 4.1 is given next.
Lemma 4.2 Consider any scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 . For any i, j = 1, . . . , r, it holds that
lim
n→∞
pij(n) = 0 if and only if lim
n→∞
Ki,nKj,n
Pn
= 0,
and under either condition we have the asymptotic equivalence
pij(n) ∼ Ki,nKj,n
Pn
.
Proof. Lemma 4.2 can easily be established by following the same arguments used in [25, Lemma
7.3] or [20, Lemma 7.4.4], namely by applying crude bounds (upper and lower) to the expression
(25). The details are ommitted here for brevity.
Next, we give a result that collects several useful consequences of the scaling condition (7) under
(11).
Lemma 4.3 Consider any scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7) holds for some c > 0.
We have
K1,nKr,n
Pn
= Θ
(
log n
n
)
. (26)
If in addition (11) holds, we have
prr(n) ∼
K2r,n
Pn
= o
(
(log n)2
n
)
. (27)
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Proof. The scaling condition (9) states that
λ1(n) =
r∑
j=1
µjp1j(n) = cn
log n
n
with limn→∞ cn = c > 0. From the proof of Proposition (4.1) we know that pij(n) increases with i
and j under any scaling. Thus, we readily obtain that
cn
log n
n
≤ p1r(n) ≤ cn
µr
log n
n
. (28)
Since µr > 0 this gives p1r(n) = Θ
(
logn
n
)
= o(1), whence we get
K1,nKr,n
Pn
∼ p1r(n) from Lemma
4.2 and (26) is readily established. We also find it useful to state the more detailed bounds
c
2
log n
n
≤ K1,nKr,n
Pn
≤ 2c
µr
(
log n
n
)
, (29)
easily seen to be valid for any n = 2, 3, . . . sufficiently large in view of (28).
We now turn to establishing (27). Comparing (26) with (11), we get
Kr,n
K1,n
=
K1,nKr,n
Pn
K21,n
Pn
= Θ
(
log n
w(1)
)
= o(log n). (30)
Next, we multiply (26) with (30) to get
K2r,n
Pn
= o
(
(log n)2
n
)
= o(1).
Invoking Lemma 4.2 with i = j = r, we obtain (27).
The following inequality will also be useful in our proof.
Proposition 4.4 For any set of positive integers K1, . . . ,Kr, P , and any scalar a ≥ 1, we have(P−⌈aKi⌉
Kj
)
( P
Kj
) ≤
((P−Ki
Kj
)
( P
Kj
)
)a
, i, j = 1, . . . , r. (31)
Proof. Fix i, j = 1, 2, . . . , r. Observe that
(
P−Ki
Kj
)
/
(
P
Kj
) ≥ 0 so that (31) holds trivially if
Kj + ⌈aKi⌉ > P . Assume here onwards that Kj + ⌈aKi⌉ ≤ P . Recalling (25), we find(P−⌈aKi⌉
Kj
)
( P
Kj
) = Kj−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− ⌈aKi⌉
P − ℓ
)
≤
Kj−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− aKi
P − ℓ
)
, (32)
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and (
P−Ki
Kj
)
( P
Kj
) = Kj−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− Ki
P − ℓ
)
. (33)
In view of (32) and (33), the desired inequality (31) will follow if we show that
1− aKi
P − ℓ ≤
(
1− Ki
P − ℓ
)a
, ℓ = 0, 1, . . . ,Kj − 1. (34)
For each ℓ = 0, 1, . . . ,Kj − 1, (34) follows as we note that
1−
(
1− Ki
P − ℓ
)a
=
∫ 1
1−
Ki
P−ℓ
ata−1dt ≤ aKi
P − ℓ
and (31) is now established.
In the course of proving Theorem 3.1 we often make use of the decomposition
log(1− x) = −x−Ψ(x), 0 ≤ x < 1 (35)
with Ψ(x) :=
∫ x
0
t
1−tdt, and repeatedly use the fact that
lim
x↓0
Ψ(x)
x2
=
1
2
. (36)
Finally, we find it useful to derive a bound on pij. Starting with (25) we write(
P−Ki
Kj
)
( P
Kj
) = Ki−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− Kj
P − ℓ
)
≤
Ki−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− Kj
P
)
=
(
1− Kj
P
)Ki
≤ e−
KiKj
P (37)
5 A proof of Theorem 3.1 – Establishing the zero-one law for
absence of isolated nodes
The proof of Theorem 3.1 passes through applying the method of first and second moments [12, p.
55] to the number of isolated nodes in G(n;µ,K, P ). To simplify the notation, we let θ = (K, P ).
Let In(µ,θ) denote the total number of isolated nodes in G(n;µ,θ); i.e.,
In(µ,θ) =
n∑
ℓ=1
1 [vℓ is isolated in G(n;µ,θ)] . (38)
5.1 Establishing the one-law
Consider now a scaling θ : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7) holds with c > 1. The random graph
G(n;µ,θn) has no isolated nodes if and only if In(µ,θn) = 0. The method of first moment [12,
Eqn. (3.10), p. 55] gives
1− E [In(µ,θn)] ≤ P [In(µ,θn) = 0] , (39)
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whence the one-law limn→∞ P [In(µ,θn) = 0] = 1 will follow if we show that
lim
n→∞
E [In(µ,θn)] = 0. (40)
By exchangeability of the indicator functions appearing at (38), we find
E [In(µ,θn)] = nP [v1 is isolated in G(n;µ,θn)] . (41)
Conditioning on the class of v1, we further get
nP [v1 is isolated in G(n;µ,θn)] = n
r∑
i=1
µiP [v1 is isolated | v1 is class i]
= n
r∑
i=1
µiP
[∩nj=2[v1 6∼ vj ] | v1 is class i]
= n
r∑
i=1
µi (P [v1 6∼ v2 | v1 is class i])n−1 (42)
where (42) follows from the fact that rvs {v1 6∼ vj}nj=2 are conditionally independent given the key
ring Σ1 of node v1. Conditioning further on the class of v2, we find
P [v1 6∼ v2 | v1 is class i] =
r∑
j=1
µjP [v1 6∼ v2 | v1 is class i, v2 is class j]
=
r∑
j=1
µj(1− pij(n))
= 1− λi(n). (43)
Using (43) in (42), and recalling (24) we get
nP [v1 is isolated in G(n;µ,θn)] = n
r∑
i=1
µi(1− λi(n))n−1 ≤ n(1− λ1(n))n−1 ≤ elogn−cn logn
n−1
n
as we also use (9). Letting n go to infinity in this last expression we immediately get
lim
n→∞
nP [v1 is isolated in G(n;µ,θn)] = 0
since limn→∞ 1 − cn n−1n = 1 − c < 0 under the enforced assumptions. Invoking (41) we now get
(40) and the one-law is established.
5.2 Establishing the zero-law
This section is devoted to establishing the zero-law in Theorem 3.1, namely the fact that inhomo-
geneous random key graph contains at least one isolated node when the scaling condition (7) is
satisfied with c < 1. We will establish this by applying the method of second moment [12, Remark
14
3.1, p. 55] to a variable that counts nodes that are class-1 and isolated. Clearly, if we show that
whp there exists at least one class-1 node that is isolated, then the desired zero-law will follow.
Let Yn(µ,θ) denote the number of isolated nodes in G(n;µ,θn) that are class-1. Namely, with
χn,i(µ,θ) denoting the indicator function that node vi is isolated and belongs to class-1, we have
Yn(µ,θ) =
∑n
ℓ=1 χn,ℓ(µ,θ). The second moment method states the inequality
P [Yn(µ,θ) = 0] ≤ 1− E [Yn(µ,θ)]
2
E [Yn(µ,θ)2]
. (44)
Also, by exchangeability and the binary nature of the rvs χn,1(µ,θ), . . . , χn,n(µ,θ), we have
E [Yn(µ,θ)] = nE [χn,1(µ,θ)] and
E
[
Yn(µ,θ)
2
]
= nE [χn,1(µ,θ)] + n(n− 1)E [χn,1(µ,θ)χn,2(µ,θ)] . (45)
It then follows that
E
[
Yn(µ,θ)
2
]
E [Yn(µ,θ)]
2 =
1
nE [χn,1(µ,θ)]
+
n− 1
n
· E [χn,1(µ,θ)χn,2(µ,θ)]
(E [χn,1(µ,θ)])
2 . (46)
From (44) and (46) we see that
lim
n→∞
P [Yn(µ,θn) = 0] = 0 (47)
holds if
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,1(µ,θn)] =∞ (48)
and
lim sup
n→∞
(
E [χn,1(µ,θn)χn,2(µ,θn)]
(E [χn,1(µ,θn)])
2
)
≤ 1. (49)
However, since In(µ,θn) ≥ Yn(µ,θn), (47) immediately implies the desired the zero-law
lim
n→∞
P [In(µ,θn) = 0] = 0.
The next two technical propositions establish the needed results (48) and (49) under the ap-
propriate conditions on the scaling θ : N0 → Nr+10 .
Proposition 5.1 Consider a scalingK1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (9) holds with limn→∞ cn =
c > 0. Then, we have
nE [χn,1(µ,θn)] = (1 + o(1))µ1n
1−cn (50)
so that
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,1(µ,θn)] =∞ if c < 1. (51)
Proposition 5.2 Consider a scalingK1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (9) holds with limn→∞ cn =
c > 0. Then, we have (49).
A Proof of Proposition 5.1 is given in Section 6.1, while Proposition 5.2 is established in Section
6.2.
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6 Proofs of Propositions 5.1 and 5.2
6.1 A proof of Proposition 5.1
Fix n = 2, 3, . . ., and pick u and θ. We have
nE [χn,1(µ,θ)] = nP [v1 is isolated and class-1] = nµ1P [v1 is isolated | v1 is class-1]
= nµ1P
[∩nj=2[v1 6∼ vj ] | v1 is class-1]
= nµ1 (P [v1 6∼ v2 | v1 is class-1])n−1 (52)
by virtue of the fact that the events {v1 6∼ vj}nj=2 are independent conditionally on Σ1. Invoking
(43), we then get
nE [χn,1(µ,θ)] = nµ1 (1− λ1)n−1 . (53)
Now, consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (9) holds with limn→∞ cn = c > 0.
Using this scaling in (53) and recalling (35) we get
nE [χn,1(µ,θn)] = nµ1
(
1− cn log n
n
)n−1
= nµ1e
−cn logn
n−1
n
−(n−1)ψ(cn log nn )
= µ1n
1−cnecn
logn
n e
−(n−1)c2n
(log n)2
n2
(
ψ(cn log nn )
(cn log nn )
2
)
. (54)
The desired result (50) is now immediate as we recall (36) and note that
lim
n→∞
cn
log n
n
= 0, lim
n→∞

ψ
(
cn
logn
n
)
(
cn
logn
n
)2

 = 1
2
, and lim
n→∞
(n− 1)c2n
(log n)2
n2
= 0
since limn→∞ cn = c > 0. From (50), we readily get (51) upon noting that µ1 > 0.
6.2 A proof of Proposition 5.2
We start by obtaining an expression for the probability that nodes v1 and v2 are class-1 and isolated
in G(n;µ,θ). We get
E [χn,1(µ,θ)χn,2(µ,θ)]
= µ21P [v1 and v2 are isolated | v1 and v2 are class-1]
= µ21P
[
Σ1 ∩ Σ2 = ∅
∣∣ |Σ1| = |Σ2| = K1]P
[
∩nj=3[Σj ∩ (Σ1 ∪ Σ2) = ∅]
∣∣∣∣ Σ1 ∩ Σ2 = ∅,|Σ1| = |Σ2| = K1
]
= µ21
(P−K1
K1
)
( P
K1
) P [Σ3 ∩ (Σ1 ∪ Σ2) = ∅
∣∣∣∣ Σ1 ∩ Σ2 = ∅,|Σ1| = |Σ2| = K1
]n−2
= µ21
(
P−K1
K1
)
( P
K1
)

 r∑
j=1
µj
(P−2K1
Kj
)
( P
Kj
)


n−2
(55)
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upon conditioning on the class of v3. Similarly, it is easy to see that
E [χn,1(µ,θ)] = µ1

 r∑
j=1
µj
(
P−K1
Kj
)
( P
Kj
)


n−1
. (56)
Combining (55) and (56), we find
E [χn,1(µ,θ)χn,2(µ,θ)]
(E [χn,1(µ,θ)])
2 =
(P−K1
K1
)
( P
K1
)


∑r
j=1 µj
(P−2K1Kj )
( PKj)(∑r
j=1 µj
(P−K1Kj )
( PKj)
)2


n−2
 r∑
j=1
µj
(P−K1
Kj
)
( P
Kj
)


−2
. (57)
Consider a scaling θ : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7) holds with c < 1. Reporting this scaling into
the last expression, we see that

 r∑
j=1
µj
(Pn−K1,n
Kj,n
)
(
Pn
Kj,n
)


−2
= (1− λ1(n))−2 =
(
1− cn log n
n
)−2
= 1 + o(1). (58)
With pij(n) increasing with i and j as shown in Proposition 4.1, it is also clear that
1 ≥
(Pn−K1,n
K1,n
)
(
Pn
K1,n
) = 1− p11(n) ≥ 1− λ1(n) = 1− cn log n
n
,
leading to (Pn−K1,n
K1,n
)
( Pn
K1,n
) = 1− o(1). (59)
Finally, we note from Proposition 4.4 that
(Pn−2K1,n
Kj,n
)
( Pn
Kj,n
) ≤


(Pn−K1,n
Kj,n
)
( Pn
Kj,n
)


2
, j = 1, . . . , r. (60)
Let Zn(µ,θn) denote a rv such that
Zn(µ,θn) =
(Pn−K1,n
Kj,n
)
(
Pn
Kj,n
) with probability µj , j = 1, . . . , r.
Applying (58), (59), and (60) in (57) we see that the desired result (49) will follow upon showing
lim sup
n→∞
(
E
[
Zn(µ,θn)
2
]
E [Zn(µ,θn)]
2
)n−2
≤ 1. (61)
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We note that(
E
[
Zn(µ,θn)
2
]
E [Zn(µ,θn)]
2
)n−2
=
(
1 +
var[Zn(µ,θn)]
E [Zn(µ,θn)]
2
)n−2
≤ e
var[Zn(µ,θn)]
E[Zn(µ,θn)]
2 (n−2) (62)
and that
E [Zn(µ,θn)] = 1− λ1(n) = 1− o(1).
Hence, we will obtain (61) if we show that
lim
n→∞
n · var[Zn(µ,θn)] = 0. (63)
In order to bound the variance of Zn(µ,θn), we use Popoviciu’s inequality [13, p. 9]. Namely,
for any bounded rv X with maximum value of M and minimum value of m, we have
var[X] ≤ 1
4
(M −m)2.
It is clear from the discussion given in the proof of Proposition 4.1 that(Pn−K1,n
Kr,n
)
(
Pn
Kr,n
) ≤ Zn(µ,θn) ≤
(Pn−K1,n
K1,n
)
(
Pn
K1,n
)
holds for any scaling. Applying Popoviciu’s inequality, we then get
var[Zn(µ,θn)] ≤ 1
4


(Pn−K1,n
K1,n
)
(
Pn
K1,n
) −
(Pn−K1,n
Kr,n
)
(
Pn
Kr,n
)


2
≤ 1
4
(
1−
(Pn−K1,n
Kr,n
)
(
Pn
Kr,n
)
)2
=
1
4
(p1r(n))
2 . (64)
Reporting the upper bound in (28) into (64) we now find
n · var[Zn(µ,θn)] ≤ n
4
(
cn
µr
log n
n
)2
. (65)
Letting n go to infinity in this last expression, we immediately get (63) as we note that µr > 0 and
limn→∞ cn = c > 0. This establishes (61) and the desired result (49) now follows.
7 A proof of Theorem 3.2 – Establishing the zero-one law for
connectivity
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is technically more involved than that of Theorem 3.1. To that end, we
outline the main arguments leading to the proof in this section and complete the remaining steps
in several sections that follow.
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider u and θ = (K, P ). We define the event
Cn(u,θ) := [G(n;µ,θ) is connected]
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and recall that
[In(u,θ) = 0] = [G(n;µ,θ) contains no isolated nodes] .
If the random graph G(n;µ,θ) is connected, then it does not contain any isolated node, whence
Cn(µ,θ) is a subset of [In(u,θ) = 0], and the conclusions
P [Cn(µ,θ)] ≤ P [In(u,θ) = 0] (66)
and
P [Cn(µ,θ)
c] = P [Cn(µ,θ)
c ∩ (In(u,θ) = 0)] + P [(In(u,θ) = 0)c] (67)
follow. Taken together with Theorem 3.1, the relations (66) and (67) pave the way to proving
Theorem 3.2. To see this, pick any scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7) holds for some
c > 0. If c < 1, then limn→∞ P [In(u,θn) = 0] = 0 by the zero-law for the absence of isolated
nodes (see Theorem 3.1), whence limn→∞ P [Cn(µ,θn)] = 0 with the help of (66). If c > 1, then
limn→∞ P [In(u,θn) = 0] = 1 by the one-law for the absence of isolated nodes, and the desired
conclusion limn→∞ P [Cn(µ,θn)] = 1 (or equivalently, limn→∞ P [Cn(µ,θn)
c] = 0) will follow via
(67) if we show the following:
Proposition 7.1 For any scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7) holds for some c > 1,
we have
lim
n→∞
P [Cn(µ,θn)
c ∩ (In(u,θn) = 0)] = 0. (68)
as long as the conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied.
In words, Proposition 7.1 states that the probability of the inhomogeneous random key graph
being not connected despite having no isolated nodes diminishes asymptotically under the enforced
assumptions. In fact, the asymptotic equivalence of graph connectivity and absence of isolated
nodes is a well-known phenomenon in many classes of random graphs; e.g., ER graphs [2], random
key graphs [25], and intersection of random key graphs and ER graphs [21].
The basic idea in establishing Proposition 7.1 is to find a sufficiently tight upper bound on the
probability in (68) and then to show that this bound goes to zero as n becomes large. Our approach
is in the same vein with the one used for proving the one-law for connectivity in ER graphs [2,
p. 164]. This approach has already proved useful in establishing one-laws for connectivity in the
standard random key graph [25] and its intersection with an ER graph [21]. Throughout the proof
of the one-law for connectivity in inhomogeneous random key graphs, several intermediate results
will be borrowed directly from [25, 21] to avoid duplication.
We begin by deriving the needed upper bound on the term (68). Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider
u and θ = (K, P ). For reasons that will later become apparent we will need bounds on the number
of distinct keys held by a specific set S of sensors; just to give a hint, this will help us efficiently
bound the probability that the sensors in S are isolated from the rest of the network. To that end,
we define the event En(µ,θ;X) via
En(µ,θ;X) =
⋃
S⊆N : |S|≥1
[|∪i∈SΣi| ≤ X|S|] (69)
where N = {1, . . . , n} and X = [X1 X2 · · · Xn] is an n-dimensional integer-valued array.
Let
Ln := min
(⌊
P
K1
⌋
,
⌊n
2
⌋)
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and set
Xℓ =


⌊βℓK1⌋ ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , Ln
⌊γP ⌋ ℓ = Ln + 1, . . . , n
(70)
for some β, γ in (0, 12) that will be specified later. With this setting, En(µ,θ;X) encodes the event
that for at least one ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, the total number of distinct keys held by at least one set of ℓ
sensors is less than βℓK11 [ℓ ≤ Ln] + γP1 [ℓ > Ln]. Below, we will show that by a careful selection
of β and γ, we can have the complement of En(µ,θn;Xn) take place whp under the enforced
assumptions on the scaling θ : N0 → Nr+10 ; i.e., for all ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, the total number of keys
held by any set of ℓ sensors will be at least βℓK11 [ℓ ≤ Ln] + γP1 [ℓ > Ln]. The relevance of this is
easily seen as we use a simple bounding argument to write
P [Cn(µ,θ)
c ∩ (In(u,θ) = 0)]
≤ P [En(µ,θ;X)] + P [Cn(µ,θ)c ∩ (In(u,θ) = 0) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c] .
It is now clear that the proof of Proposition 7.1 and hence that of Theorem 3.2 will consist of
establishing the following two results.
Proposition 7.2 Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7) holds for some c > 1,
(13) is satisfied for some σ > 0, and (11) holds. We have
lim
n→∞
P [En(µ,θn;Xn)] = 0. (71)
where Xn = [X1,n · · · Xn,n] is as specified in (70) with β in (0, 12) is selected small enough to
ensure
max

2βσ, β (e2
σ
) β
1−2β

 < 1, (72)
and γ in (0, 12 ) is selected so that
max
(
2
(√
γ
(
e
γ
)γ)σ
,
√
γ
(
e
γ
)γ)
< 1. (73)
A proof of Proposition 7.2 can be found in Section 8. Note that for any σ > 0, limβ↓0 β
(
e2
σ
) β
1−2β
= 0
so that the condition (72) can always be met by suitably selecting β > 0 small enough. Also, we
have limγ↓0
(
e
γ
)γ
= 1, whence limγ↓0
√
γ
(
e
γ
)γ
= 0, and (73) can be made to hold for any σ > 0 by
taking γ > 0 sufficiently small.
Proposition 7.3 Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7) holds for some c > 1,
(13) is satisfied for some σ > 0, and (11) holds. We have
lim
n→∞
P [Cn(µ,θn)
c ∩ (In(u,θn) = 0) ∩En(µ,θn;Xn)c] = 0. (74)
where Xn = [X1,n · · · Xn,n] is as specified in (70) with γ in (0, 12 ) is selected small enough to
ensure (73) and β ∈ (0, 12) is selected such that (72) is satisfied.
The proof of Proposition 7.3 is outlined in Section 9 with several steps completed in the sections
that follow.
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8 A proof of Proposition 7.2
The proof of Proposition 7.2 will follow similar steps to [21, Proposition 7.2] and rely heavily on
the results obtained by the author in [20]. Using a standard union bound we first write
P [En(µ,θ;X)] ≤
∑
S⊆N :1≤|S|≤n
P
[|∪i∈SΣi| ≤ X|S|] = n∑
ℓ=1

 ∑
S∈Nn,ℓ
P [|∪i∈SΣi| ≤ Xℓ]


where Nn,ℓ denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , n} with exactly ℓ elements. Let Uℓ(µ,θ)
be given by
Uℓ(µ,θ) = | ∪ℓi=1 Σi|, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n.
By using exchangeability and the fact that |Nn,ℓ| =
(n
ℓ
)
, we get
P [En(µ,θ;X)] ≤
n∑
ℓ=1
(
n
ℓ
)
P [Uℓ(µ,θ) ≤ Xℓ]
=
Ln∑
ℓ=1
(
n
ℓ
)
P [Uℓ(µ,θ) ≤ ⌊βℓK1⌋] +
n∑
ℓ=Ln+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P [Uℓ(µ,θ) ≤ ⌊γP ⌋] . (75)
Now, consider any scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 and recall the ordering (6) of the key ring
sizes. For any ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n define Uℓ(K1,n, Pn) as
Uℓ(K1,n, Pn) =st Uℓ({1, 0, 0 . . . , 0},θn).
In other words, Uℓ(K1,n, Pn) stands for the rv that has the same distribution with Uℓ(µ,θn) when
µ is degenerate with µ1 = 1 and µj = 0 for all j = 2, . . . , r; i.e., when all key ring sizes are equal
to K1. With this setting, Uℓ(K1,n, Pn) is equivalent to the rv defined similarly for the standard
random key graph in [25, 21, 20], where it was often denoted by Uℓ(θn) with θn = (Kn, Pn). Given
(6), it is a simple matter to check that
Uℓ(K1,n, Pn)  Uℓ(µ,θn), µ = (µ1, . . . , µr) (76)
with  denoting the usual stochastic ordering. This can be seen by an easy coupling argument
where all sensors first receive K1,n keys and then an additional Kℓ,n−K1,n keys are assigned to each
sensor independently with probability µℓ. Since additionally distributed keys can only increase the
variable Uℓ, we obtain (76).
Reporting (76) into (75) we now get
P [En(µ,θn;Xn)] ≤
Ln∑
ℓ=1
(
n
ℓ
)
P [Uℓ(K1,n, Pn) ≤ ⌊βℓK1,n⌋] +
n∑
ℓ=Ln+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P [Uℓ(K1,n, Pn) ≤ ⌊γPn⌋] .
Assume now that the scaling under consideration satisfies (7) for some c > 1, (13) with σ > 0, and
(11). It was shown [20, Proposition 7.4.14, p. 142] that for any scaling K1, P : N0 → N0 ×N0 such
that (13) holds for some σ > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
n∑
ℓ=Ln+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P [Uℓ(K1,n, Pn) ≤ ⌊γPn⌋] = 0 (77)
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whenever γ in (0, 12) is selected so that (73) holds; see also [20, Proposition 7.4.17, p. 152]. Hence,
the desired conclusion (71) will follow if we show that
lim
n→∞
Ln∑
ℓ=1
(
n
ℓ
)
P [Uℓ(K1,n, Pn) ≤ ⌊βℓK1,n⌋] = 0 (78)
under the condition (72). However, it can be seen from [20, Proposition 7.4.13, p. 140] and [20,
Proposition 7.4.16, p. 146] that with β in (0, 12 ) small enough to ensure (72) we have (78) for any
scaling K1, P : N0 → N0 × N0 such that K1,n = w(1). With this last condition clearly ensured
under (13) and (11) we obtain (78). The proof of Proposition 7.2 is now completed.
9 A proof of Proposition 7.3
We will now work towards establishing (74), namely showing that the probability of G(n;µn,θn)
being not connected despite having no isolated nodes approaches zero as n gets large under the
event En(µ,θn;Xn)
c. Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider u and θ = (K, P ). For any non-empty
subset S of nodes, i.e., S ⊆ V = {v1, . . . , vn}, we define the graph G(n;µ,θ)(S) (with vertex set
S) as the subgraph of G(n;µ,θ) restricted to the nodes in S. With each non-empty subset S of
nodes, we associate several events of interest: Let Cn(µ,θ;S) denote the event that the subgraph
G(n;µ,θ)(S) is itself connected. It is clear that Cn(µ,θ;S) is completely determined by the rvs
{Σi, vi ∈ S}. We say that S is isolated in G(n;µ,θ) if there are no edges between the nodes in S
and the nodes in the complement Sc = {v1, . . . , vn} − S. Let Bn(µ,θ;S) denote the event that S
is isolated in G(n;µ,θ), i.e.,
Bn(µ,θ;S) := [Σi ∩ Σj = ∅, vi ∈ S, vj ∈ Sc] .
Finally, we set
An(µ,θ;S) := Cn(µ,θ;S) ∩Bn(µ,θ;S).
Our main argument towards establishing (74) relies on the following key observation: IfG(n;µ,θ)
is not connected and yet has no isolated nodes, then there must exist a subset S of nodes with
|S| ≥ 2 such that G(n;µ,θ)(S) is connected while S is isolated in G(n;µ,θ). This is captured by
the inclusion
Cn(µ,θ)
c ∩ (In(u,θ) = 0) ⊆
⋃
S⊆V : |S|≥2
An(µ,θ;S) (79)
It is also clear that this union need only be taken over all subsets S of {v1, . . . , vn} with 2 ≤ |S| ≤
⌊n2 ⌋.
We now apply a standard union bound argument to (79) and get
P [Cn(µ,θ)
c ∩ (In(u,θ) = 0) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c]
≤
∑
S⊆V : 2≤|S|≤⌊n
2
⌋
P [An(µ,θ;S) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c]
=
⌊n
2
⌋∑
ℓ=2

 ∑
S∈Vn,ℓ
P [An(µ,θ;S) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c]

 (80)
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where Vn,ℓ denotes the collection of all subsets of {v1, . . . , vn} with exactly ℓ elements.
For each ℓ = 1, . . . , n, we simplify the notation by writing An,ℓ(µ,θ) := An(µ,θ; {v1, . . . , vℓ}),
Bn,ℓ(µ,θ) := Bn(µ,θ; {v1, . . . , vℓ}) and Cn,ℓ(µ,θ) := Cn(µ,θ; {v1, . . . , vℓ}). With a slight abuse of
notation, we use Cn(µ,θ) for ℓ = n as defined before. Under the enforced assumptions, exchange-
ability yields
P [An(µ,θ;S)] = P [An,ℓ(µ,θ)] , S ∈ Vn,ℓ
and the expression
∑
S∈Vn,ℓ
P [An(µ,θ;S) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c] =
(
n
ℓ
)
P [An,ℓ(µ,θ) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c] (81)
follows since |Vn,ℓ| =
(n
ℓ
)
. Substituting into (80) we obtain the key bound
P [Cn(µ,θ)
c ∩ (In(u,θ) = 0) ∩En(µ,θ;X)c] ≤
⌊n
2
⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P [An,ℓ(µ,θ) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c] . (82)
Next, we derive bounds for the probabilities appearing at (82). Recall the definitions (2) and
(3).
Proposition 9.1 Consider θ = (K, P ) and µ = (µ1, . . . , µr) such that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ · · · ≤ Kr. We
have
P [An,ℓ(µ,θ) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c] ≤ min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr)
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1,E
[
e−
(Xℓ+1)|Σ|
P
]})n−ℓ
(83)
where |Σ| denotes a rv such that
|Σ| = Kj with probability µj, j = 1, . . . , r.
Proof. We start by observing the equivalence
Bn,ℓ(µ,θ) =
[(
∪ℓi=1Σi
)
∩ Σj = ∅, j = ℓ+ 1, . . . , n
]
.
Hence, under the enforced assumptions on the rvs Σ1, . . . ,Σn, we readily obtain the expression
P
[
Bn,ℓ(µ,θ)
∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ] = n∏
j=ℓ+1
E


(P−|∪ℓi=1Σi|
|Σj |
)
( P
|Σj |
)

 = E


(P−|∪ℓi=1Σi|
|Σ|
)
( P
|Σ|
)


n−ℓ
where |Σ| denotes a rv that takes the value Kj with probability µj for each j = 1, . . . , r. Note that
we always have | ∪ℓi=1 Σi| ≥ K1, while it holds that | ∪ℓi=1 Σi| ≥ Xℓ + 1 on the event En(µ,θ;X)c.
Combining, we get
P
[
Bn,ℓ(µ,θ) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c
∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ] ≤

min

E
[(P−K1
|Σ|
)
( P
|Σ|
)
]
,E


(P−(Xℓ+1)
|Σ|
)
( P
|Σ|
)






n−ℓ
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≤
(
min
{
1− λ1,E
[
e−
(Xℓ+1)|Σ|
P
]})n−ℓ
, (84)
where in the last step we also used (37).
Conditioning on the rvs Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ which fully determine the event Cn,ℓ(µ,θ)), we conclude via
(84) that
P [An,ℓ(µ,θ) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c] = P [Cn,ℓ(µ,θ)) ∩Bn,ℓ(µ,θ)) ∩ En(µ,θ;X)c]
= E
[
1 [Cn,ℓ(µ,θ))]P
[
Bn,ℓ(µ,θ) ∩En(µ,θ;X)c
∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ]]
≤ P [Cn,ℓ(µ,θ))]
(
min
{
1− λ1,E
[
e−
(Xℓ+1)|Σ|
P
]})n−ℓ
.
In view of this last bound, Proposition 9.1 will be established if we show that
P [Cn,ℓ(µ,θ))] ≤ ℓℓ−2 (prr)ℓ−1 . (85)
To see why (85) holds, observe that the subgraph of G(n;µ,θ) on the vertices v1, . . . , vℓ, here-
after denoted Gℓ(n;µ,θ), is connected if and only if it contains a spanning tree. Let Tℓ denote the
collection of all spanning trees on the vertex set {v1, . . . , vℓ}. Then, we have
Cn,ℓ(µ,θ) = ∪T∈Tℓ [T ⊆ Gℓ(n;µ,θ)]
By Cayley’s formula [15] there are ℓℓ−2 trees on ℓ vertices, i.e., |Tℓ| = ℓℓ−2. In addition, for any T
in Tℓ, it is clear that
P [T ⊆ Gℓ(n;µ,θ)] ≤ P [T ⊆ Gℓ(n; {0, . . . , 0, 1},θ)]
since Kr ≥ Kj for any j = 1, 2, . . . , r − 1; i.e., probability that the tree T is contained in this
subgraph is maximized when all the nodes in the subgraph belong to class-r that are assigned the
largest number of keys. With µr = 1, Gℓ(n;µ,θ) becomes equivalent to the standard random key
graph Gℓ(n;Kr, P ) for which it is known [25, Lemma 9.1] that
P [T ⊆ Gℓ(n;µ,θ)] = (prr)ℓ−1 , T ∈ Tℓ, ℓ = 2, 3, . . .
This follow from the fact that a tree on ℓ nodes consists of ℓ− 1 edges and that edge events in the
random key graph are pairwise independent. Collecting, we obtain via a union bound that
P [Cn,ℓ(µ,θ)] ≤
∑
T∈Tℓ
P [T ⊆ Gℓ(n;µ,θ)] ≤
∑
T∈Tℓ
P [T ⊆ Gℓ(n; {0, . . . , 0, 1},θ)] ≤ ℓℓ−2 (prr)ℓ−1 .
This establishes (85) and the proof of Proposition (9.1) is now completed.
Now, consider a scaling θ : N0 → Nr+10 as in the statement of Proposition 7.3. Using this scaling
in (82) together with (83) we see that the proof of Proposition 7.3 will be completed once we show
lim
n→∞
⌊n
2
⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
= 0. (86)
24
Combined with Proposition 7.2, this will lead to Proposition 7.1 and hence to Theorem 3.2. To
that end, we devote the rest of the paper to establishing (86). Throughout, we make repeated use
of the standard bounds (
n
ℓ
)
≤
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
,
ℓ = 1, . . . , n
n = 1, 2, . . .
(87)
and
⌊n/2⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
≤ 2n, (88)
where the latter follows from the Binomial formula.
10 Establishing (86)
We will establish (86) in several steps with each step focusing on a specific range of the summation
over ℓ. Throughout this section, we consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (7)
holds for some c > 1, (10) holds for some σ > 0 and (11) is satisfied. The desired result (86) follows
from (90), (95), (101), (104), and (107) that are established in Sections 10.1-10.5, respectively.
10.1 The case where 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ R
The first range considers fixed values of ℓ. For the moment, fix an integer R that will be specified
later in Section 10.2; see (96). For each ℓ = 2, . . . , R we use (87), (27), and (7) to get
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
≤
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1 (1− λ1(n))n−ℓ
≤ (en)ℓ(prr(n))ℓ−1e−cn logn
n−ℓ
n
= o(1)nℓ
(
(log n)2
n
)ℓ−1
n−cn
n−ℓ
n
= o(1)n1−cn
n−ℓ
n (log n)2ℓ−2
= o(1) (89)
upon noting that limn→∞ 1− cn n−ℓn = 1− c < 0 on the given range of ℓ. Thus, for any R we have
lim
n→∞
R∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
= 0. (90)
10.2 The case where R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤
⌊
µrn
2βc logn
⌋
Next, we handle the range where R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤
⌊
µrn
2βc logn
⌋
. Noting that K1,n ≤ Kr,n, we realize
from (26) that
K21,n
Pn
= O
(
logn
n
)
, or equivalently that Pn
K21,n
= Ω
(
n
logn
)
. Also, (10) and (11) imply
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together that K1,n = w(1), leading to
Pn
K1,n
= w
(
n
logn
)
. Hence, on the range under consideration
here, we have ℓ ≤ Ln = min(⌊ PnK1,n ⌋, ⌊n2 ⌋) so that Xℓ,n = ⌊βℓK1,n⌋. With this in mind, we get
E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]
≤ E
[
e−
βℓK1,n|Σ|n
Pn
]
=
r∑
j=1
µje
−
βℓK1,nKj,n
Pn ≤ 1− µr + µre−
βℓK1,nKr,n
Pn . (91)
In view of (29),
βℓ
K1,nKr,n
Pn
≤ βℓ 2c
µr
log n
n
≤ 1.
holds for all n sufficiently large and ℓ ≤ µrn2βc logn . Hence, on the same range we have
1− e−
βℓK1,nKr,n
Pn ≥ βℓK1,nKr,n
2Pn
.
Reporting these into (91) we get
E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]
≤ 1− µr
(
1− e−
βℓK1,nKr,n
Pn
)
≤ 1− µr βℓK1,nKr,n
2Pn
≤ e−µrβc4 ℓ lognn (92)
for all n sufficiently large, where the last inequality follows from the lower bound in (29).
Consider now the range of n sufficiently large that (92) is valid. Using (92), (87), and (27), we
get
⌊
µrn
2βc log n
⌋∑
ℓ=R+1
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
≤
⌊
µrn
2βc log n
⌋∑
ℓ=R+1
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
ℓℓ−2
(
(log n)2
n
)ℓ−1
e−
µrβc
4
ℓ logn
n
(n−ℓ)
≤ n
⌊
µrn
2βc logn
⌋∑
ℓ=R+1
(
e(log n)2
)ℓ
e−
µrβc
4
ℓ log n
n
(n−⌊n
2
⌋)
≤ n
∞∑
ℓ=R+1
(
e(log n)2e−
µrβc
8
logn
)ℓ
. (93)
Since µr, β, c are all positive scalars, we have
lim
n→∞
e(log n)2e−
µrβc
8
logn = 0
so that the infinite series appearing at (93) is summable. In fact, we have
n
∞∑
ℓ=R+1
(
e(log n)2e−
µrβc
8
logn
)ℓ
= (1 + o(1))n
(
e(log n)2e−
µrβc
8
logn
)R+1
= O(1)n1−(R+1)
µrβc
8 (log n)2R+2. (94)
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It is now clear that we get
lim
n→∞
⌊
µrn
2βc log n
⌋∑
ℓ=R+1
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
= 0 (95)
as long as R satisfies
R ≥
⌈
8
µrβc
⌉
. (96)
Since µr, β, c > 0, such a selection is permissible given that (90) holds for any positive integer R.
10.3 The case where
⌊
µrn
2βc logn
⌋
+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ min{Ln, ⌊νn⌋}
We now consider the range where µrn2βc logn < ℓ ≤ min{Ln, ⌊νn⌋} for some 0 < ν < 1/2 to be specified
later; see (100). From (70), we see that Xℓ,n = ⌊βℓK1,n⌋ so that (91) still holds. Using (91) and
(29) on the given range, we get
E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]n−ℓ
≤
(
1− µr + µre−
βℓK1,nKr,n
Pn
)n−ℓ
≤
(
1− µr + µre−β
µrn
2βc log n
c
2
log n
n
)n/2
=
(
1− µr + µre−
µr
4
)n/2
(97)
for all n sufficiently large. Also, since
(n
ℓ
)
is monotone increasing in ℓ over the range 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊n/2⌋
we have (
n
ℓ
)
≤
(
n
⌊νn⌋
)
≤
( e
ν
)νn
(98)
by means of (87).
Using (97) and (98) we now find
min{Ln,⌊νn⌋}∑
ℓ=
⌊
µrn
2βc log n
⌋
+1
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
≤ n
( e
ν
)νn (
1− µr + µre−
µr
4
)n/2
= n
(( e
ν
)ν (
1− µr + µre−
µr
4
)1/2)n
, (99)
for all n sufficiently large. With µr > 0, it always holds that(
1− µr + µre−
µr
4
)1/2
< 1,
while we have
lim
ν→0
( e
ν
)ν
= 1.
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Therefore, for any µr > 0, ν can be selected small enough to ensure that.(( e
ν
)ν (
1− µr + µre−
µr
4
)1/2)
< 1. (100)
With ν selected according to (100), we immediately obtain
lim
n→∞
min{Ln,⌊νn⌋}∑
ℓ=
⌊
µrn
2βc log n
⌋
+1
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
= 0
(101)
in view of (99).
10.4 The case where min{Ln, ⌊νn⌋} + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ Ln
Our next goal is to handle the range min{Ln, ⌊νn⌋} + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ Ln, where it still holds that
Xℓ,n = ⌊βℓK1,n⌋. This range will become obsolete if Ln ≤ ⌊νn⌋, so we only consider the case where
⌊νn⌋ < Ln, and hence the range ⌊νn⌋ + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ Ln. On this range, we use the crude bound
|Σ|n ≥ K1,n to get
E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]n−ℓ
≤
(
e−
βℓK21,n
Pn
)n−ℓ
≤ e−
βℓK21,n
Pn
n
2 ≤ e−
βνK21,n
2Pn
n2 , (102)
where we also note that n− ℓ ≥ n2 . Using (102) and (88) we now get
Ln∑
ℓ=min{Ln,⌊νn⌋}+1
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
≤

 Ln∑
ℓ=min{Ln,⌊νn⌋}+1
(
n
ℓ
) e−βνK21,n2Pn n2
≤
(
2e−
βνK21,n
2Pn
n
)n
. (103)
Under the enforced condition (11) on the scaling we have that
K21,n
Pn
n = w(1), so that
2e−
βνK21,n
2Pn
n = o(1)
since β, ν > 0. Reporting this into (103), we immediately obtain
lim
n→∞
Ln∑
ℓ=min{Ln,⌊νn⌋}+1
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
= 0
(104)
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10.5 The case where Ln + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋
Finally, we consider the range Ln + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋
, where we have Xℓ,n = ⌊γPn⌋ as stated in (70).
Using once again the crude bound |Σ|n ≥ K1,n we get
E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]n−ℓ
≤ (e−γK1,n)n−ℓ ≤ e−γK1,n n2 . (105)
In view of (105) and (88) we find
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=Ln+1
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
≤


⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=Ln+1
(
n
ℓ
) e−γK1,n n2
≤
(
2e−
γK1,n
2
)n
. (106)
As before, we have under (10) and (11) that K1,n = w(1) leading to
2e−
γK1,n
2 = o(1).
Reporting this into (106), we immediately obtain
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=Ln+1
(
n
ℓ
)
min
{
1, ℓℓ−2(prr(n))
ℓ−1
}(
min
{
1− λ1(n),E
[
e−
(Xℓ,n+1)|Σ|n
Pn
]})n−ℓ
= 0. (107)
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Appendix
A A proof of Corollary 3.3
In this section, we will show that combined together Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 is equivalent to
Corollary 3.3 under the enforced assumptions. Consider a probability distribution µ = (µ1, . . . , µr)
with µi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 . The aforementioned
equivalence of the results will follow upon showing the equivalence of the conditions (7) and (14),
namely that for any c > 0 we have
λ1(n) ∼ c log n
n
if and only if
K1,nE [|Σ|n]
Pn
∼ c log n
n
.
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In order to establish this, we will show that either of the conditions (7) or (14) individually imply
λ1(n) ∼ K1,nE[|Σ|n]Pn , or equivalently that
r∑
j=1
p1j(n)µj ∼
r∑
j=1
K1,nKj,n
Pn
µj . (A.1)
Since µj > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , r, (A.1) will follow immediately if we show under either (7) or (14)
that
p1j(n) ∼ K1,nKj,n
Pn
, j = 1, . . . , r. (A.2)
Lemma 4.2 readily gives (A.2) as we note that for all j = 1, . . . , r, (7) implies p1j(n) = o(1) while
(14) implies
K1,nKj,n
Pn
= o(1). The equivalence of Theorem 3.1-Theorem 3.2 with Corollary 3.3 is
now established.
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